China’s Wen seeks to boost blossoming Africa ties

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meets African leaders on Sunday, aiming to boost a relationship which politically goes back decades and is now economically booming — to the discomfort of some in the West.

All eyes will be on new offers of aid to Africa at the meeting in Egypt, after President Hu Jintao promised $5 billion in loans and credit at the last summit in Beijing in 2006.

Blossoming trade and business ties have drawn Western criticism that Beijing is only interested in African resources, while Chinese commentators retort that envious Europeans still treat the continent like a colony.

Wen himself underlined the strength of the relationship. “Despite the great distance between China and Africa, the friendship between our two peoples has remained strong,” he told a business forum in the Egyptian resort of Sharm El-Sheikh before the main meeting.

Chinese officials have been coy about exactly how much more Wen may offer. But a draft action plan, details of which were obtained by Reuters, showed China will increase aid to African countries despite the effects of the global economic crisis.

“China has all along had an interest in Africa’s development, and genuinely wants to build homes for Africans and make a contribution toward improving livelihoods,” Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Deming wrote in the state-run International Business Daily this week.

China’s friendship with Africa dates back to the 1950s, when Beijing backed liberation movements in the continent fighting to throw off colonial rule.

Trade has jumped in the past decade, driven by Chinese hunger for resources to power its economic boom and African demand for cheap Chinese products.

Still, this has not been without its critics, who say China is only interested in African resources and supports governments with dubious human rights records as a means to get them.

Such criticism makes China angry, and draws rebukes that the West still views Africa as though it were a colony.

“The West is envious of China and Africa drawing closer,” popular Chinese tabloid the Global Times, published by Communist Party mouthpiece the People’s Daily, wrote on Tuesday.

“Europeans view Africa as their own backyard,” the newspaper quoted Chinese Africa expert Xu Weizhong as saying. “Of course they feel uncomfortable about the arrival of the Chinese.”

Some Africans welcome how China’s approach differs from that of Europe or the United States.

“China’s policy is based on mutual development. Few Western countries have a foreign policy like this — most are about telling Africans what to do,” said Kwaku Atuahene-Gima, executive director of the Africa program at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai.

China says it is up to Africans to decide whether the relationship is good for them, and is sure they will say it is.

Cowboy Capitalism: Chinese Companies in Africa

Transit riders switching trains at the Montgomery BART subway station in downtown San Francisco will find it difficult to miss the new ads covering the walls, the floor and even the stairs with pictures of Sudanese refugees. The advertisements’ message is attention catching: “Are you invested in genocide?” As part of the Save Darfur Coalition’s Divest for Darfur campaign, the ads urge transit users to visit their website, where they are asked to demand that investment firms – specifically JP Morgan, Franklin Templeton, Fidelity Investments, Capital Group (American Funds), and Vanguard – withdraw investments from companies like the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which are, according to the website, “filling the coffers of the Sudanese government and helping fund the government’s actions in Darfur.” (As a side note, the use of the term “genocide” by groups like Save Darfur to describe the conflict in Sudan is highly controversial. For more information, read the transcript of Professor Mahmood Mandani’s June 4th interview with Amy Goodman on Democracy Now!, titled “The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency.”

­ The CNPC has been heavily censured for continuing to do business in Sudan, despite the ongoing conflict there. Attempting to place pressure on firms invested in the state-owned CNPC, rather than on the CNPC itself, is a way for activists to circumvent the “no strings attached” stance of the Chinese government toward investment in Africa and other parts of the world. China prides itself on having a different approach to investment than western lending organizations like the World Bank or IMF, which have numerous development and human rights stipulations attached to investments. In Sudan, this means that the government doesn’t have to bend to international pressure to, say, allow UN troops into Darfur. Many African governments welcome Chinese investment specifically because of this hands-off approach. In a recent article in the New York Times, Lydia Polgreen comments on the increasing presence of Chinese companies in Africa, especially in the rich natural resources and mining sector. Manganese mines in South Africa, uranium pits in Nigeria and cobalt mines in the Congo are all areas of investment for state-owned Chinese companies, like the Nonferrous Metals Corporation.

African citizens view Chinese investment with ambivalence. Some see economic relationships with China as a source of much needed income and a step up from paternalistic relationships with the West. “Let the Chinese come,” said Mahamat Hassan Abakar, a lawyer in Chad. “What Africa needs is investment. It needs partners. All of these years we have been tied to France. Look what it has brought us.” Others are more critical, seeing China as just another country robbing Africa of its resources and in the process enriching local elites, bolstering repressive governments and perpetuating Africa’s secondary economic status. Cheap Chinese goods flooding Africa inhibit local manufacturing and the jobs that accompany it. Unsafe working conditions lead to industrial accidents like the 2005 blast at a Chinese-owned explosives factory in Chambishi, Zambia, which killed 51 people.

The investment of Chinese state-owned companies in Africa is hardly a win-win situation, but it is easy to recognize the attraction for African governments doing business with Chinese companies. In judging if China is a partner or colonizer in Africa, the answer is probably, a little of both.

The Chinese seduction of Africa

To some alarm in America and Europe, the Chinese have launched a significant offensive to win resources, markets and, yes, hearts in Africa. The centerpiece of the new Chinese initiative was an elaborate, costly summit in Beijing last weekend. It attracted a large percentage of African heads of state, and Beijing was elaborately decked out for the affair. More to the point, President Hu Jintao promised to double Chinese aid to Africa, to make available $5 billion in new credits and loans, and to train 15,000 African professionals.

For China, Africa offers resources and markets. Chinese trade with Africa amounted to $40 billion last year and is headed toward $50 billion this year. As many as 2,000 new deals are said to have been signed at the summit. China wants to exploit the African market of upwards to a billion people, and in some ways it is a perfect fit, just as with the United States, where low-cost Chinese exports compete with high-cost local products. China also wants access to Africa’s natural resources.Chief among these is oil. Africa has more than a dozen oil-producing countries, whose percentage of world production is growing steadily. The continent also is something of a treasure house of copper, cobalt, zinc, manganese, nickel and coltan, not to mention gold and silver. It has substantial timber resources and hydroelectric energy capacity which, if developed, could fuel Chinese companies’ production in Africa.

Why China and not Europe or the United States?

European countries traditionally operate in Africa in opposition to each other — especially the British against the French — so it is difficult for Europe to mount a coordinated counteroffensive to the Chinese. The Europeans also labor under the cloud of their colonialist past, which the Africans have by no means forgotten, and the French continue to meddle in some former colonies with French armed forces. It is always done in the name of stabilization, but some of their troops serve to keep unsavory dictators, such as Gabon’s President Omar Bongo, in power.

America’s role in Africa remains as flaccid now as it has been throughout most of the period of African independence, starting roughly in 1960. The United States got a good start in Africa when President John F. Kennedy decided that Africa was important to America, in no small part because of our country’s vibrant African American heritage. But this period also was influenced by the global Cold War, when the United States was competing with the Soviet Union and, later, with the People’s Republic of China, for influence in Africa. After Mr. Kennedy, it was straight down hill for American interest in Africa. Africa since then has ranked dead last in terms of U.S. regional interests, behind Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and, since 2001, even South Asia. America’s foreign policy types know this. So, unfortunately for us, do the Africans.

The United States over the years fell behind other countries in addressing African issues, including decolonization of the Portuguese territories — Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau — because of Portugal’s membership in NATO. It lagged in addressing the racist government of Southern Rhodesia because of concern over access to cobalt, and it held onto close relations with apartheid South Africa long after the handwriting was on the wall there.

In recent years, the U.S. response to humanitarian and political crises in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia and now Sudan has been tardy and hesitant, reflecting the low level of interest in Africa among succeeding administrations in Washington, as well as among Americans in general.

China has been trading with Africa for centuries, long before the economic surge powering its current offensive. In the early days of African independence, Chinese involvement was low-cost and sporadic, prompted partly by Chinese-Soviet rivalry. The Chinese have always made the Africans a little nervous, with their frenetic work ethic and somewhat hard-edged commercial orientation. But they have learned a lot.

Two elements give them the advantage over America in Africa now. The first is that, unlike American businessmen, who are generally risk-averse and spoiled in terms of personal lifestyle, the Chinese take economic risks for the prospect of gain, and their people will go and live anywhere. American companies always have had a devil of a time finding people to work in Africa.

The second, perhaps even more important advantage that the Chinese have over Americans and, to a degree, over the Europeans, is that the Chinese do not attach a big bundle of non-business conditions to their aid and trade.

The Americans are affected by their political view of African countries — are they democratic, do they respect human rights, are they corrupt? The current American administration is also concerned about religious orientation. Are Islamist elements active? Are Christian missionaries free to proselytize?

The Chinese come. They couldn’t care less about a country’s state of democracy or human rights. I can still remember the look on the face of the Chinese ambassador in Kinshasa, in what was then Zaire, when I asked him if China was prepared to pressure the regime of then-President Mobutu Sese Seko to hold elections. He was polite, because I was the American ambassador, but he clearly thought I had a screw loose.

So China will do well in Africa, particularly in competing for the oil resources controlled by some of Africa’s scruffier governments — in Angola, Sudan, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the like. American companies will still win in some cases because of superior technology, but, in general, the United States will pay the price for the way it is, for better or for worse.

The Chinese Are Coming!

It looks like the dealmaking synapses of China’s corporate chieftains are going haywire. On June 21, China’s Haier Corp., backed by private equity firms Blackstone Group and Bain Capital, bid $1.28 billion for appliance maker Maytag Corp. (MYG ) — home to not only the loneliest repairmen in town but also a brand getting beaten by more efficient rivals such as Whirlpool (WHR ), General Electric (GE ), and Electrolux (ELUX ). The move by Haier comes as CNOOC (CEO ), a Chinese oil giant, has bid $18.5 billion for Unocal (UCL ) potentially scuttling the takeover plans of Chevron (CVX ). And late last year, Beijing-based Lenovo Group Ltd., China’s biggest computer maker, bought IBM’s (IBM ) PC business. <!– if (!window.OAS_sitepage) { var BW_site; // use for new ad site var BW_page = “/magazine”; var OAS_listpos; // use to restrict the number of available page positions document.write(”); } //–>

Neither Haier nor CNOOC has its prey in hand, and there are plenty of obstacles to any potential deal. Nonetheless, get ready for resounding cries from U.S. politicians and pundits about the Chinese assault on venerable American corporate assets.

But before trade hawks start smashing Haier refrigerators on the Capitol steps, consider this: It’s true that many mainland companies are flush with cash — or ample credit lines from pliant Chinese banks — and that they enjoy rock-bottom manufacturing costs. Some will undoubtedly rise to global prominence alongside the likes of General Electric, Toyota (TM ), and Nokia (NOK ). Haier and CNOOC might make it into the winner’s circle. But right now a lot of Chinese companies with little experience managing global brands and distribution are trying to buy their way into the big leagues in a hurry. That’s dangerous, since some 70% of acquisitions fail, says Jonathan Woetzel, a consultant with McKinsey & Co. in Shanghai. “There is no reason to expect Chinese companies to do it any better,” he says.

In at least one case they appear to be having trouble. TCL Corp., a leading Chinese appliance maker, acquired Alcatel’s (ALA ) mobile-handset operation and spun the business into a joint venture last August. The project lost $45.7 million in the first quarter, selling just 1.53 million handsets. That’s a pace of about 6 million phones annually, far below the 20 million envisioned when the venture was set up. It’s unclear how a similar deal TCL has with French TV maker Thomson Electronics, owner of the RCA brand, is faring. But in handsets the electronics company has a hard fight on its hands in its core mainland market as foreign rivals such as Motorola Inc. (MOT ) and Nokia have won back market share. “TCL’s handset business is in crisis,” says Ted Dean, managing director of BDA China Ltd., a Beijing technology-research firm.

Unlike the Japanese giants that muscled their way into U.S. real estate in the 1980s, Chinese outfits shopping for brands aren’t always coming from a position of strength, especially in the ferociously competitive landscape of the mainland. Haier’s profits last year were flat, and its gross margins for refrigerators dropped to 16.5% from 19.2% in 2003 as competition raged in China and materials costs jumped. Lenovo saw its profit for the quarter ended Mar. 31 (before the IBM deal was closed) slip by 12% as prices for PCs in China tumbled.

Haier boss Zhang Ruimin is justly famous in China for turning an ailing state company into a powerful mainland brand. But pulling off a salvage job on Maytag may be tricky. (Neither Maytag nor Haier is commenting on the offer.) The American company has been a laggard in outsourcing its production overseas. Its Hoover vacuum-cleaner business is losing money. And U.S. retail chain Best Buy Co. (BBY ) recently dropped Maytag products. An effort by the Chinese suitor to save the Maytag brand would require a whole new skill set for Haier, which has relentlessly pursued a strategy of pushing only one brand around the world. But if Haier just wants Maytag’s sales and service channels, its technology, and perhaps a few U.S. plants — Haier already has its own factory in South Carolina — the Chinese company will have to persuade millions of Americans to accept the Haier brand instead of Maytag. China is definitely asserting itself in the global marketplace. But will the Chinese turn out to be the shrewdest of dealmakers — or just the buyers of last resort for ailing companies? The answer to that question will make all the difference.

The Chinese are coming

G8: Africa – One country is investing large sums abroad – and it doesn’t make a fuss about human rights or good governance. Lindsey Hilsum on China, the new continental power

On Sunday mornings, the boys of Freetown play a football match on Lumley Beach, tackling each other in the sand, rushing into the waves after the ball. Little shops and bars have sprung up, and itinerant merchants sell trinkets to foreign aid workers and anyone else with money. But more ambitious plans are in train for this un- spoilt strip of yellow sand and mangrove swamp. The Sierra Leone tourism board and the Chinese construction company Henan Gouji recently signed an agreement for a $200m (£110m) resort with golf course, five-star hotel and beach bungalows.

The tourism minister, Chernor Jalloh, unfurls an artist’s impression featuring a Chinese-style clock tower, pagoda-roofed holiday homes, fountains and happy tourists – European, Chinese and African. “Why should we wait for Britain or anyone else to get here?” he asks. “The Chinese are the ones coming to invest now.”

For Tony Blair, Africa needs saving – nowhere more so than Sierra Leone, limping out of civil war. But China sees Africa as a proving ground for its “go global” policy, sending burgeoning private companies across the world to create new multinational corporations.

Nearly 700 Chinese companies operate in 49 African countries. Chinese trade with Africa will reach $30bn next year – triple the level five years ago. By the end of 2005, I read in Le Monde, China will overtake Britain as Africa’s third-largest trading partner. It is increasingly turning to Africa as a source of the oil, timber and minerals needed to drive its own phenomenal growth.

Yet China is not a member of the G8, and Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa report makes only one glancing reference to the impact of the People’s Republic on the continent.

Three decades ago, the People’s Republic built stadiums and other prestige projects across Africa to show solidarity, and supported anti-colonial guerrilla groups to spread communist ideology. In the 1980s it retreated to build economic success back home. Now China is back in Africa, spreading capitalism and a model of development in which human rights, democracy and welfare are distractions from the main business of economic growth.

Since the end of Sierra Leone’s civil war in 2002, Chinese state and private companies have changed the face of the country’s capital, Freetown. The new parliament, military headquarters and main government office block are all Chinese-built, while the football stadium, originally donated by China in the 1970s, and the biggest hotel, the Bintumani, have both been renovated by Chinese firms. The Chinese have invested in an industrial complex, a tractor factory and sugar plant. “High risk brings high return,” says Yang Zhao, manager of the Bintumani, which is run by the state-owned Chinese Beijing Urban Construction Group.

“Africa is a good environment for us to invest in, because there’s too much competition in Europe and America.”

While European firms would baulk at the cost of renovating and running a 270-bed hotel in a potentially unstable, desperately poor African country, the Chinese minimise risk by keeping overheads low. The salary of a Chinese manager is a fraction of his European equivalent’s. Everything in the hotel is imported from China, down to the sign on the toilet which reads “Ladie’s” and the red lanterns in the porch, which swing in the tropical downpour. The doors are so small that a European has to stoop to pass through, and the electronic console that controls the lights beeps in the night when Freetown experiences its customary power cuts. No matter. What the Sierra Leonean government notes is that the Chinese are easy to deal with, and they have the cash.

“We like Chinese investment because we have one meeting, we discuss what they want to do, and then they just do it,” says Sahr Johnny, Sierra Leone’s ambassador to Beijing, who was taking Chinese investors round potential sites, including a hydroelectric power plant. “There are no benchmarks and preconditions, no environmental impact assessment. If a G8 country had offered to rebuild the stadium, we’d still be having meetings about it.”

That is what worries anti-corruption campaigners. “We’ve spent 15 years working on conventions against corruption, and now the Chinese come in and they haven’t signed up to any of it,” says Zainab Bangura of Sierra Leone’s National Accountability Group. “They’re secretive and they only deal with governments – they don’t consult civil society or anyone. I’m worried that African governments will see China as an alternative to G8 countries, because with the Chinese they don’t have to worry about good governance and all that.”

Nowhere is the issue more acute than in oil-rich Angola, rated by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Last year China’s export bank, Exim Bank, extended a $2bn line of credit to the Angolan government for infrastructure projects. In return for a low interest rate and a generous repayment schedule, Angola agreed to provide 10,000 barrels of oil a day and to award large construction contracts to Chinese firm. Meanwhile, negotiations over an IMF loan faltered because the Angola resisted anti-corruption conditions.

While America maintains partial oil sanctions against Sudan, China has become that country’s biggest trading partner. Sixty per cent of Sudanese oil goes to China and Chinese companies are involved in nearly all new oil exploration, production and refinery projects. No wonder China refused to sign harsh UN Security Council resolutions about atrocities in Darfur last year, choosing to abstain instead. It is now providing a few peacekeepers in southern Sudan to show support for the international effort to end war. For the Chinese, the only thing that really matters is Sudan’s potential to supply 9 per cent of their oil needs.

“I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them,” said China’s assistant deputy foreign minister Zhou Wenzhong, in an interview with a US newspaper last year. “You have tried to impose a market economy and multiparty democracy on these countries, which are not ready for it. We are also against embargoes, which you have tried to use against us.”

“The Chinese are very nice,” said Awad al-Jaz, Sudan’s energy and mining minister. “They don’t have anything to do with politics or problems. Things move smoothly, successfully.”

Chinese companies have built three small-arms factories on the outskirts of Khartoum – weapons manufactured there were captured by southern rebels during the civil war, which ended in January. China also sold an estimated $1bn worth of armaments to both sides during the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict in the late 1990s. Celebrating 25 years of independence in May, the Zimbabwean leader, Robert Mugabe, enjoyed a fly-past by three brand new Chinese fighter-jets he had purchased in the teeth of an EU arms embargo. “We are looking to the east where the sun rises, and have turned our backs on the west where the sun sets,” he said.

In two decades China has lifted 400 million of its own people out of poverty – they haven’t exactly made poverty history, but their success has not gone unnoticed in Africa. Compared to G8 countries and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, African leaders see China as dynamic and decisive, rather than full of empty promises. China’s rapid penetration of Africa poses a challenge that G8 leaders meeting in Gleneagles do not appear to have factored in to their calculations.

“People say China is a sleeping giant,” says Zainab Bangura, “but it’s wide awake. It’s the elephant creeping up behind us. Only, it’s so big we can scarcely see it moving.”

Chinese Aid Flows into Africa

Increasing numbers of Chinese leaders are visiting Africa, as Beijing pledges to boost its aid package to the continent

The Chinese government is pouring aid into Africa, and is writing off millions of dollars in debts owed it by various African countries. China is promising further financial relief to Africa, as it seeks to gain access to the continent’s natural resources to sustain its development. But China’s aid to Africa, which comes with no political strings attached, remains controversial. There are also allegations of poor labor practices by Chinese companies in Africa. Analysts are convinced that China’s investment strategies on the continent will have to change if it’s to be perceived as a true partner in Africa’s development, and not as a new exploiter of the continent’s resources. In the fourth of a five-part series, VOA’s Darren Taylor examines the nature of China’s aid to Africa, and further concerns about the Far Eastern giant’s growing presence on the continent.

Some analysts describe China as a “rogue donor” because of its apparent willingness to “bail out” and bolster administrations such as those of Zimbabwe and Sudan by means of aid funds and investments. When threatened with financial and other sanctions by the West, such states have turned to China for help, and the country often seems eager to please – in so doing, seeming to counter efforts at democratic reforms in Africa.

Responding to concerns that China’s aid to Africa is to the detriment of good governance on the continent, a senior official at China’s Embassy in Washington D.C., Sun Baohong, says: “We are dedicated to non-interference and social development of African countries.”

She says the Chinese government understands that “sometimes African countries will be in extremely difficult (political) situations” like “social instability” – but she says it believes that sanctions and other methods as promoted by the West are “not productive” and lead only to “increasing hostility…We think that when you’re dealing with a failing state or a sensitive state, other methods than those used by Western people will be more productive.”

In terms of their new strategic partnership with Africa, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have made several promises to the continent – including that of doubling aid to Africa to a billion dollars per annum. According to the Chinese government, up until 2006 it had given $5.74 billion in aid to Africa – and this figure excludes debt relief, which the Chinese don’t consider aid.

Beijing is setting aside a $5 billion fund for Chinese investment in Africa; preferential loans and buyer’s credits will amount to an additional $5 billion; China has pledged large-scale debt cancellation amounting to tens of millions of dollars in Africa and is training African professionals, building infrastructure and establishing “economic cooperation zones” on the continent.

An expert on China at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Joshua Kurlantzick, says the country’s goals in giving aid to Africa are clearly access to the continent’s natural resources, markets for Chinese multinational companies, political allies and the isolation of Taiwan.

Chinese tools of influence in achieving these goals, says Kurlantzick, include large aid disbursements, aid-linked commercial loans that are quickly forgiven, and the promotion of Chinese language studies – increasing numbers of Africans are going to China for training and education.

Prof. Deborah Brautigam, of American University’s School of International Service who has been studying China’s relationship with Africa since the early 1980’s, says the Chinese have been giving aid to the continent and cooperating with it economically since the 1950’s and 1960’s, when China began establishing agricultural and health projects, and building factories, in Africa.

“Since the 1980’s, there’s been a switch from one-way aid loans from China to Africa, to cooperation that is beneficial to both partners,” says Brautigam.

She’s of the opinion that the economic exchanges between Africa and China are only now getting attention because of fears that China’s motive in giving aid and building infrastructure is to curry favor with African leaders to ultimately plunder the continent of its natural resources.

Various underlying principles characterize China’s current aid to Africa, according to Brautigam – especially the principle of mutual benefit.

“Chinese aid is not supposed to be like these alms coming to the poor, but is supposed to be something of mutual benefit, and they’re very frank about that. It’s also got no conditions – this is controversial. It’s supposed to have quick results – this is why they use a lot of Chinese labor (in Africa),” she explains.

Sun says Chinese aid to Africa has two key elements: “The first is no political strings attached. And the second is…we try to do the utmost within our capacity to help Africa…We fully respect the wills of the African countries. Each time we implement the projects through friendly negotiations.”

In China, says Brautigam, aid is merely one part of an economic relationship with Africa that is focused on commerce and business.

Since the 1980’s, Chinese aid projects in Africa have tended to evolve into trade projects, she explains. Chinese workers have provided aid and then remained behind upon completion of the project to provide a platform for Chinese companies to bid for state contracts.

“What happens is that the Chinese aid teams that constructed the stadiums and other things stay behind and they retain their equipment, so they are well positioned to start bidding on government contracts,” Brautigam explains.

Another controversial aspect of China’s evolving presence in Africa is the country’s provision of cheap labor to African countries – Mauritius, for example, has hired Chinese workers for its factories, to the exclusion of local workers.

“We take advantage of our low cost, cheap materials, technology and cheap labor to maximize our efficiency of aid (to Africa),” Sun maintains.

But the “dumping” of cheap Chinese goods and labor upon African economies has bred increasing resentment of China in some parts of the continent.

Sun says the criticism is the result of “misunderstanding.” She understands all the “sudden focus” on China’s involvement in Africa as follows: “Some people are curious. Some people are interested. Some people have prejudices. And some people fear for their domination in this regard, and they fear that the alternative constitutes competition.”

But Prof. Ian Taylor, who studies Chinese foreign policy at the Department of International Relations at St. Andrews University in Scotland, says the rejection of criticism of China’s policies in Africa on the basis that it’s “simply jealousy by Westerners” and based upon hypocrisy because of the West’s previous colonial domination and exploitation of Africa “misses the point, because it’s not only Westerners who are raising concerns: It’s more and more Africans themselves.”

Taylor says “serious” political leaders, civil society and media in Africa are increasingly beginning to criticize China’s behavior on the continent.

But the Executive Director of Nigeria’s Centre for Law and Social Action, Ndubisi Obiorah, says “fierce critiques” of China’s involvement in Africa are often perceived by people on the continent as being motivated by the West’s fear of losing its traditional influence over Africa and losing access to natural resources.

“Some of these less rational critiques have the effect of sort of driving Africans into China’s arms; the attitude (in Africa) is: If the West is against it, then there must be something good in it,” says Obiorah.

But US businesswoman, Carolyn Harper, says the criticism of China’s “rush” into Africa is often valid. She has regular contact with African enterprises, and says their managers often complain to her about “poor practices” and “unfair competition” by their Chinese counterparts.

“I’m hearing bad reports from my African sisters and brothers, that (the Chinese) are stealing from them; (the Chinese) are fighting them from getting their own fish out of the water…They (Africans) have to import fish from the US of A, because they have to fight the Chinese to get the fish out of their own waters,” Harper says.

Sun responds that China is a “sovereign state, and we have legitimate national interests for development. When we pursue business in Africa, it’s to maximize benefits on both sides.”

She reiterates that China has a legitimate right to try to feed and “develop” a population of 1.3 billion people, but agrees that this shouldn’t be achieved at the expense of Africa.

“What we engage with Africa is indeed a win-win policy, and it’s a win-win model, and we do not want to do anything…detrimental to Africans’ interest, that is why China is so popular on the African continent nowadays,” Sun maintains.

But China is not popular in some parts of Africa, according to Kurlantzick – particularly in southern Africa.

“(In southern Africa) you have a kind of explosive mix of powerful trade union movements – particularly in South Africa and to some extent in Zambia; (there are) perceptions that Chinese companies have poor labor and environmental policies. It (China) has significant investments in dangerous sectors like mining, and a substantial amount of Chinese aid. You have the potential for a very explosive situation.”

In some cases in Africa, anti-Chinese feeling has found expression in violence. In October last year, rioters attacked Chinese people and businesses in Zambia’s capital, Lusaka, after local police had opened fire on mineworkers who were protesting against poor working conditions in Chinese-owned mines in the country. The political opposition had also accused China of exploitation and turning Zambia into a “dumping ground” for Chinese “slave labor.” In the past few years, more than 30,000 Chinese nationals have moved into Lusaka, where the riot took place. During President Hu’s visit to Zambia in February, miners and retrenched textile workers continued their anti-China protests.

The demonstrations offered more evidence of growing resentment in Africa about the use of imported Chinese labor in factories and mines across the continent. China ships immigrants to Africa to work on large-scale construction projects, at textile mills and mines. For Chinese corporations operating in Africa, there are many benefits to this – including exemption from local labor and wage legislation and a workforce that can easily be fired and sent back home.

In Nigeria, China has received a lot of bad press as a result of poor working conditions in Chinese-owned factories. Workers have been processing metal ores without essential masks to protect them from noxious susbstances. There’ve been discharges of gas from Chinese factories in Lagos, which have also pumped poisonous effluent into rivers.

But a Kenyan businessman based in the US, Ronald Kamau, says Africans are “overwhelmingly” happy that China is providing an alternative to the “unidirectional” option of international trade and commerce presented by the West.

A compatriot of Kamau’s, Kevin Kihara, who’s studying economics at a college in Washington D.C., agrees.

“Africa is just interested in business; we’re not interested in anything else…What Africans want is business and development; we want a better life. So we just want to find out, where can we get more Chinese businesses?”

Obiorah says Kihara’s opinion mirrors that of the majority of Nigerian businesspeople, who give little consideration to reports of poor labor practices by Chinese-owned enterprises – unless they’re directly affected themselves, – and who pay even less attention to allegations that China is fomenting human rights abuses in Africa.

“The word China does not evoke Darfur or Zimbabwe; the first thing that comes to mind for Nigerian businesspeople when you mention China, is business. The see China as a source of cheap consumer goods, of cheap and cost effective manufacturing technology, of cheap and cost effective expatriate technicians,” Obiorah explains.

Sun says China is not forcing anything on Africa, that it supports “good business practice” in its enterprises on the continent and that it’s dedicated to the economic benefit of all Africans.

But Taylor disputes this.

“Things have been said like: The Chinese will listen to Africa’s will and promote socioeconomic development. Well, my take on that is that actually there’s a contradiction there because when we talk about state to state relationships particularly in Africa, (China is) not listening to the African people’s wills; (China is) listening to African elites’ wills; their interests and inclinations are extremely different to what the ordinary citizens’ might be.”

Taylor says there’s “considerable evidence” that Chinese policies – for example, non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, “make life worse for many Africans.”

But, having said this, Taylor believes that China is “simply acting in a pragmatic and self-interested manner and following its own understanding of particular concepts, such as human rights, sovereignty and non-interference. The problem is not necessarily Beijing, but is to be found in the nature of many African nations.”

In a similar vein, Kurlantzick asserts that if the Chinese are indeed guilty of widespread abuse with regard to their business interests in Africa, then it’s up to African leaders to act, by means of laws and regulations, to protect their people against such exploitation and abuse.

Nevertheless, asserts Taylor, China has a responsibility in its engagement with Africa.

“If China’s leaders are genuine in their belief that Chinese engagement with Africa will not repeat the crimes of European colonizers, then engaging without damaging remains the fundamental challenge to China’s Africa policies.”

China often says it doesn’t want to repeat the mistakes of the past – yet through its support of “gangs of crooks” in Africa, this is precisely what it’s doing, according to Taylor.

Sun reaffirms China’s support for Africa’s efforts to “strengthening democracy, to strengthening rule of law and practicing good governance” but she once again emphasizes that China won’t “force any political systems on Africa as a precondition for our aid.”

Taylor, though, is convinced that China will soon learn that it cannot promote “long-term mutual benefit” and “win-win situations” in an environment where it’s engaging with “illegitimate states, whose policies promote instability, economic underdevelopment and political autocracy.”

But he does see “encouraging signs” that China is becoming a “lot more sensitive” in its engagements with countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe.

In recent visits to Africa, Chinese leaders have avoided Zimbabwe, and when President Hu visited Khartoum, he asked President Omar al-Bashir for a speedy resolution to the Darfur crisis – which is the closest Beijing has yet come to “interference” in the affairs of a sovereign state, observers say.

In the near future, Taylor foresees that Beijing will move away from the “rhetoric of win-win situations and mutual benefit,” to a China that is truly dedicated to true economic development for all, not just the elites of Africa.

“At the moment, it appears that China is actively undermining human security in Africa – either deliberately, in cases like Sudan – or by default. But I’m very hopeful that China’s policies towards Africa are evolving and maturing, and that we’ll see positive developments in the future.”

Growing Pains and Growing Alliances: China, Timber and Africa Timber hungry China moves into Africa

China, as the fastest growing economy in the world, is poised to make significant impacts on the global market and the global environment, especially with its expanding involvement with nations rich in natural resources but deficient in economic and political stability. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Africa where China has rapidly bolstered its ties in recent years with the majority of the continent’s 54 nations.

There are many reasons to account for this seemingly unlikely set of alliances with a most distant neighbor. Among them is the diminished presence of the United States and other Western powers on the continent, with the majority of the attention trained presently on the Middle East. The standard US response in recent years to local conflict in African nations has been to withdraw both troops and civilians, reduce military aid and issue security advisories to would be visitors and investors. During the Ethiopia-Eritrea war in the late 90s, China’s government sent over more citizens viewing the war as an opportunity — in the absence of an American presence — to expand its influence on and strengthen its connections to Ethiopia.

Today, the strong Chinese presence in Ethiopia is shared in other African nations. Beijing, representing the whole of the governing body for China, is pushing broadly and laterally into the continent nurturing deep economic, political and militaristic ties, and angling for prime access to Africa’s vast natural resource base.

At stake: more than potential economic gains

In fostering these relationships, China seeks to establish and maintain geopolitical alliances that will aid in maneuvering the country into the status of a global superpower. China is concerned with reasserting political authority over Taiwan — its wayward, economically and socially superior cousin — as well as establishing a certain degree of political muscle against the US and its manifestation as the primary global force in international organizations like the United Nations.

Into Africa

China is pushing into Africa on many fronts. In Nigeria, where oil is abundant, China is rebuilding the railways. In Rwanda, Chinese companies have paved more than 80 percent of the main roads, and in Zambia, Chinese companies own one of the country’s largest copper mines. In more than a dozen countries, Chinese firms are searching for oil and gas while rebuilding electrical grids and telecommunications networks. The investment interests range from massive state-funded projects to small private ventures as Beijing pushes for its government, corporations and citizens alike to set up shop. Some government officials from the US have taken notice of this activity and have growing concerns about China’s increasing monopolistic influence on Africa. Among other resources, the continent is becoming a major global supplier of timber and China may soon control access to this resource. And unlike the US, which bars companies from doing business with outlaw regimes, Beijing expresses no qualms about dealing with Africa’s most brutal and corrupt leaders, while Chinese businessmen take on and fund projects that Western countries reject on principle. China’s ties to Africa go back to the 1950s when Beijing got behind various independence movements as a means of countering US and Soviet influence in the region.

Chinese developers are active in infrastructure projects in poor African countries like Madagascar. Photo credit: ©2005 Julie Larsen Maher / WCS

Beyond establishing control over African resources, China is looking to line up economically marginal nations to serve as producers of and markets for its products in the future. As China gains ground in these markets, the US stands to lose out: in spite of a trade pact signed with Africa in 2000, American influence has leveled off and even declined in many of the continent’s nations.

China’s quest for resources

China’s insatiable demand for resources is rooted in its tremendous economic growth. With growth rates exceeding 7%, it is estimated that by 2020 the GDP of China will exceed that of Japan, behind only the US and EU. China’s need for resources — including everything from aluminum to crude oil to wildlife parts — has driven it to pursue resources beyond its borders. Recent domestic events have made foreign sources for raw materials an even greater imperative. An example can be found in the government’s response to the devastating Yangtze River floods of 1998 which resulted in more than 2500 deaths and caused billions of dollars in damage. Blaming rampant logging in the region, the Chinese government summarily banned timber harvesting in large areas of the country. Orders were issued to protect healthy forests, rehabilitate compromised regions and replant many woodland areas that had been cleared for agricultural use. Further, offcials launched a crackdown on illegal logging within China. Environmentalists saw these new precepts, provisions and activity as a reason for hope that China might be altering its environmental course for good. Their optimism was short-lived. While the ban has improved forestry management in China, environmental groups charge that the government now goes elsewhere for the wood it needs, accelerating timber poaching in other nations and becoming the main hub of a global network of trade of illegal timber.

China wants wood

China’s need for timber is evident, but the government is quick to deny the controversial means for supplying that need. The Chinese government has continually claimed that their country has a self-sustainable timber industry, but then has gone on to slash tariffs on imported timber. The State Forest Administration (SFA) recently completed a five-year survey of the country’s forests which found that consumption and production of timber are evenly balanced and that the industry will continue meeting China’s need for wood from its own forests for the foreseeable future. According to The Economist, a senior SFA official has said, “It is out of the question that the country would satisfy its domestic demands by increasing tree-felling from neighboring countries.” The choice of the term “neighboring countries”-gives China a convenient exception clause since it excludes Equatorial Guinea, along with other African and South American nations. When one puts these kind of assertions from the government, exception clauses or not, next to figures from various environmental groups, the chasm between the two becomes painfully glaring and wide.

According to conservationists and some fairly compelling statistics, China is already importing vast quantities of timber, much of which is illegally harvested. Imports of industrial wood — used in construction, furniture-making and pulp mills — have more than tripled since 1993. Even if the allegations put forth by various green groups are false, China’s predicted growth rates and recent forest preservation measures in country suggest that the nation cannot possibly support itself on domestic supply alone. According to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), China’s demand for imported industrial wood — timber, paper and pulp — will grow by at least 33 percent within the next five years, from the current 94 million cubic meters to 125 million cubic meters.

One of the major contributing factors accounting for the rapid growth of the industry is construction, says Zhu Chungquan, forest program director of the Beijing-based WWF agency. To put a number on the level of demand in perspective, one government initiative, a housing reform package set out in 1998, ironically enough, calls for the construction of five billion square meters of new housing and two billion square meters of renovated housing by 2005. This package is part of the country’s urbanization policy to increase living spaces and quality of life in the ever increasing crowded conditions in Chinese cities. What is more, the Chinese government plans on moving 300 million rural people into the cities.

China now trails only the US in wood consumption and with the country’s projected growth rates, China is sure to soon surpass the States to frontrunner status for consumption. According to the WWF, the flourishing construction and furnishing sectors accounted for the consumption of 90 million cubic meters of timber in 2003, or 65 percent of the total consumption rate for China — 138 million cubic meters. Beyond the construction of living quarters, China’s economic growth results in emergent wealth. With greater spending power and economic means, people are replacing furniture at a faster rate and remodeling. Adding fuel to the fire, by 2010, the WWF predicts that China will be able to meet only half of its demand for industrial wood. The Britain-based environmental group, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) asserts that China imported one million cubic meters of logs in 1997 and 16 million cubic meters in 2002.

In China, as in so many areas of the world where problematic environmental practices have seductive and have undeniable economic benefits, all of this reportedly illegal timber is providing a great number of jobs. According to The Economist, The small town of Nanxum near the port city of Zhangjiagang used to produce only small amounts of wooden floorboards up until about five years ago. Today, there are 500 floorboard factories and about 200 sawmills, which the EIA says together process one merabu log — a type of sturdy tropical hardwood — every minute of every work day. The explosion of work opportunities and production from this industry is clear, but the origin and sheer quantity of the supply is certainly troublesome. The government-issued statements and actual directives simply do not add up. Logging cannot be limited as supply and production soar.

What the Chinese government does and does not endorse as the truth aside, other bodies assert some disturbing claims for logging activity in several African nations. According to British website www.globaltimber.org.uk, China — along with Russia, Brazil, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea — is also taking significant amounts of wood from forests in Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Liberia.

In Cameroon, 50 percent of exports of timber are illegally performed. The figure is 90 percent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as dealers with political ties flagrantly disregard a law requiring log processing prior to export since China’s primary interest is in logs. In Equatorial Guinea it is again 90 percent with the same indifference to laws concerning maximum allowable cut and de facto concession size (largely attributable to one company and its sponsors, most of which supply China’s imports). Gabon comes in at 70 percent, while Liberia again reaches 90 percent, with a recent surge linked to the civil war.

Illegal exports, the species from which the wood-based products that China exports in greatest quantity, are generally not declared in national trade statistics, for obvious reasons. The result of the secrecy is that there is no way to determine the true extent of illegal logging and exporting activity; it may be even worse than reported, but impossible to track. Further, a large proportion of these exports comprises commodities, notably furniture, for which unlike most other trading nations, China chooses not to declare weight or other physical measures of quantity. This provides a convenient bureaucratic loophole through which literal tons and tons of timber can pass though undocumented. As imports soar along with corruption and incompetence within the sector, it seems this situation will only worsen until the industry implodes from its own ill-conception and operation.

Given China’s reportedly poor environmental record and current practices, this burgeoning stronghold on African resources is a grave situation. Back in the Beijing office of the WWF, Chungquan is lobbying Chinese sourcing companies to join the Chinese Forest and Trade Network, a business-environmental partnership for certified wood. Despite the figures and unsustainable trajectory, Chungquan retains some optimism for China’s future, and hopefully, some peripheral benefit for the African nations it imports from. He believes that China’s admittance into the WTO and APEC may encourage importers to use certified wood as tariffs are lowered. Few on the environmental side may share this opinion, but there is always hope.

Into Africa: China’s Grab for Influence and Oil

Amid festering concerns about China’s burgeoning global power, Beijing has firmly set its sights on expanding its influence in Africa. In a throwback to the Maoist revolutionary days of the 1960s and 1970s and the Cold War, Beijing has once again identified the African continent as an area of strategic interest.

But this time, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not interested in exporting international communism. It is international trade, economics, and political influence that have got Beijing’s rapt attention. The jury is still out about whether China’s strong engagement in Africa is a good or a bad thing. Some have praised Chinese involvement in Africa, while others have called it “neo-colonialism.” There is no doubt that it is a subject of intense discussion in Washington, D.C.

Just this week in the U.S. edition of the Financial Times, in an editorial titled “No Panacea for Africa: China’s Influence Is Not an Alternative to Neo-Liberalism,” the newspaper’s editorial staff wrote that “China’s footprint in Africa becomes more pronounced each time the continent receives another high-level Chinese delegation.” It continued:

President Hu Jintao’s eight-nation tour of Africa this week has been no exception. In its wake we can expect more roads, more bridges, and airports, more oil deals, more credit and also more Chinese labor on the continent. We can also expect more cheap imports.

This article doesn’t cover it all, but it is a pretty good place to begin a discussion of recent Chinese activity in Africa.

What Does China Want in Africa?

It is clear they want something: In the last year, Chinese leaders have visited half of Africa’s countries. In fact, Beijing declared 2006 the “Year of Africa” and promised to make their first major high-level diplomatic trip of every year to Africa.

Indeed, this week, Chinese President Hu Jintao is on a 12-day, eight-nation visit to Africa. In November of 2006, Beijing hosted a major summit with African leaders, which nearly 50 African heads of state attended. China lavished African leaders with diplomatic pomp and circumstance, as well as promises of generous financial, commercial, and military assis­tance. Its theme was “The Three 50s”: 50 years of China–Africa relations, the existence of over 50 African nations, and $50 billion in bilateral Sino–African trade.

Beijing has also written off at least $1 billion in African debt, and more write-offs are expected. The World Bank believes that the Chinese import–export bank has loans valued at nearly $13 billion in infrastructure projects in Africa alone. As a matter of fact, the African Development Bank has chosen to hold its annual summit in Shanghai this spring in recognition of China’s increasingly pivotal role in the region.

But China isn’t doing all of this out of the kindness of its heart. In fact, most might say that China is seeking new markets for its export-driven economy—now the world’s fourth largest. In addition, China wants unimpeded—even exclusive—access to Africa’s abundant natural resources, especially sources of energy. And don’t forget: As a rising power, China is also keen on gathering political influence in Africa.

A Few Words About Energy

Arguably, nothing is driving China into Africa more than its quest to satisfy its insatiable appetite for oil and gas. For the past decade, the Chinese economy has expanded annually at near double-digit rates, requiring an enor­mous influx of natural resources, especially energy.

China is now the world’s second largest energy consumer, leading Beijing to Africa’s door in an effort—like the U.S.—to find new sources of energy and reduce its reliance on volatile Middle Eastern sources of oil and natural gas. Today, Africa provides China with 30 percent of its energy imports, meeting 5 percent of China’s energy needs and rivaling the Middle East as a source of Chinese energy.

Beijing is building ties with African energy suppliers through invest­ment, aid, high-level visits, and a strict policy of “non­interference in internal affairs” that some African governments under international scrutiny find comforting. The People’s Republic of China has invested billions in resource development and infrastructure—and written off billions more in debt—to help build friendly relationships with oil-rich African coun­tries. For instance:

• China has $3 billion invested in Nigerian oil, now the world’s eighth largest oil exporter.
• Beijing has at least $3 billion invested in the Sudanese energy sector, for a total of $10 billion since the 1990s.
• In Angola, another African energy giant, a $2 billion credit line for much-needed infrastructure projects secured Chinese access to highly coveted offshore oil fields. Today, Angola is China’s biggest oil supplier, outpacing China’s previous largest supplier, Saudi Arabia.

While some are critical of China for seeking exclusive access to oil and gas supplies in Africa, others applaud Beijing’s willingness to take risks in markets where some Western energy firms can’t—or won’t—go for a variety of reasons, arguably adding to world energy supplies, lowering prices, and benefiting consumers.

What About Politics?

Across the planet, China is aggressively seeking new friends and allies and proving to be a less demanding alternative to the more scrupulous relationships nations must have with the U.S. and Europe.

One of the places Chinais seeking political influence at the expense of others is Africa. Think about it: With over 50 nations, the countries of Africa represent more than one-quarter of the United Nations General Assembly—a significant voting bloc.

Friendly relations with African nations can bring favorable results for Chinese efforts at the United Nations or U.N. agencies such as the World Trade Organization. They can even reduce the number of states that diplomatically recognize Taiwan: There are five countries in Africa that still recognize Taiwan.For example, in recent years, African states have been pivotal in preventing Taiwan from joining the World Health Organization and in tabling a condemnation of Chinese human rights practices at the U.N.’s Commission on Human Rights.

New Markets and Commercial Opportunities

China also sees Africa as a potential market for its goods. China–Africa trade soared to $56 billion last year, an increase of 40 percent over 2005, bringing critical revenue to some of the world’s poorest nations. The Chinese economy is still export-driven, and Beijing must continue to find and develop new markets to ensure that its economy continues to grow and draw foreign direct investment.

Today, there are over 800 Chinese companies operating in nearly all African nations. Anecdotally, I’ve heard stories that in some cases, market penetration and influence are more important than profits for Chinese companies operating in Africa.

Unfortunately, China’s activities in Africa are not without controversy. Some applaud Chinese engagement in Africa, saying it brings in billions in aid, loans, and credits—all reportedly without political conditions. Others, disillusioned with Western leaders, think China might better understand the unique problems of African underdevelopment. Some say that diplomatically, the Chinese treat them as equals.

Some Africans and Chinese find common ground in the view that the West’s historical experiences in achieving development are distant from the African experience. They add that the Western model offers too few transferable lessons for Africa and has generated too few dramatic success stories in Africa to be worthy of further consideration.

Beijing supports this notion by promoting the idea that engagement with the West is overly moralizing, conditional, and overly bureaucratic. Moreover, paraphrasing from the Council on Foreign Relations 2005 report on Africa, China is also investing and providing assistance in areas that Western aid agencies have long neglected—physical infrastructure, industry, and agriculture.

The CFR report also says that China offers African nations a financing alternative to Western donors, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, providing choices these countries might not otherwise have. As a Nigerian government commerce official said, “The U.S. will talk to you about governance, efficiency, about security, about the environment. The Chinese just ask: How do we procure this license.”[1] Many African governments also like the Chinese policy of “non-interference” in their internal affairs.

African Concerns

But Beijing’s involvement in Africa also has its critics, including the Africans.

PRC firms underbid local African companies, and Chinese contractors often use cheap, imported Chinese labor. Some contracts require 70 percent Chinese labor, adding little to local employment or skill development.

Moreover, cheap Chinese goods flood African markets, especially textiles, stifling markets that Africans are trying to develop, causing unemployment, and shuttering factories across the continent. And concessionary PRC soft loans have put the International Monetary Fund and other bank projects on hold due to concerns about economic mismanagement and corruption.

More specifically, South African President Thabo Mbeki recently cautioned that China risks replicating in Africa a “colonial relationship” of the kind that existed under white rule. Those are pretty strong words, especially coming in advance of the visit of the Chinese president.

Even though South Africa is China’s largest trading partner, local labor officials have blamed unemployment problems on cheap Chinese clothing imports. In Zambia, where China has significant copper mining interests, there has been a political backlash against the Chinese over labor practices. In fact, a Zambian presidential contender last year ran on a political platform wholly criticizing Chinese presence in the country.

According to The Wall Street Journal, anti-Chinese sentiment bordering on racism is also bubbling over in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Lesotho.[2]

A Kenyan professor warned of Chinese hegemony in Africa and asserted that Beijing is pursuing its own narrow self-interests on the continent—interests that benefit only Africa’s elites. Some African critics see China as assisting African governments to oppress their own people and complain about the Chinese failure to engage in efforts to build African civil society and civil society institutions, ignoring public opinion and needs.

There is also concern about China’s promotion of its economic model and lending practices. Beijing actively promotes its development model in Africa, based on a limited market economy controlled by an authoritarian government. In some cases, it has become fashionable for African leaders to argue that China’s embrace of the continent offers them a new economic development model that rejects the practices of the Western free market.

Many African regimes, desperate to invigorate their struggling economies while maintaining a strong grip on political power, find China’s modernization model preferable to difficult free-market and democratic reforms advocated by the U.S. and the European Union. Many think this is a mistake. The same Financial Times editorial that I mentioned earlier warned that while the Chinese may attempt to reassure their new African partners that economic development is compatible with authoritarianism, Africans should not turn away from free markets.[3]

There is also mounting concern that Chinese lending practices are undermining international debt-relief strategies that have dramatically reduced the debt burden in Africa. The fear is that Chinese lending practices may result in the rapid reestablishment of an unsustainable level of debt in Africa once again. Last October, the World Bank president expressed the worry that many of Africa’s poorest countries may be incurring excessive new debt as a result of unconditional loans made by Chinese banks.[4] The U.S. Treasury Department put a finer point on it, calling China a “rogue creditor” practicing “opportunistic lending.”[5]

China in Sudan and Zimbabwe

China’s involvement with Sudan and Zimbabwe is a glaringly troubling issue for the international community. Sudan, perhaps, represents the most troubling example of China’s new Africa policy, where Beijing combines its drive for exclusive access to African natu­ral resources with an aggressive political cam­paign to ingratiate itself with controversial regimes.

While the U.S., the European Union, Japan, and others sought to impose U.N. sanctions on the Sudanese regime over Khartoum’s support for what many are now calling a genocide in Darfur—in which 450,000 have died and 2.5 million are homeless—China strenuously opposes Security Council sanctions. Why, you might ask? Some believe that China was hoping to prevent international economic sanctions from interfering with Beijing’s $3 billion investment in Sudan’s oil and gas industry.

Tragically, Khartoum has doubled its defense budget in recent years, spending 60 percent to 80 percent of its estimated $500 million in annual oil revenue—half from China—on weapons. Some of these weapons find their way to the conflict in Darfur. Moreover, with Chinese assistance, the Sudanese government recently built three weapons factories, complicating international arms embargos against Khartoum.

The comment of the former Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister reflects Beijing’s Africa policy: “Business is business. We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them.”[6]

In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe’s repeated political and human rights abuses led the U.S. and the European Union to impose punitive sanctions against the regime. The PRC’s response was to sell Zimbabwe over $200 million worth of fighter aircraft and military vehicles. Beijing also provided equipment for jamming anti-government media broadcasts from inside and outside the country and gave electronic surveillance equipment to Harare’s security services to monitor political opponents.

Zimbabwe, the world’s second largest exporter of platinum, also gets China’s support internationally. In 2005, Britain and the U.S. backed yet another U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Mugabe’s policies. Meanwhile, Mugabe flew to Beijing, seeking a handout for his beggared economy and Chinese support at the U.N., which Beijing gave, killing the resolution.

China’s support for African leaders like Mugabe and Sudan’s Bashir lends these leaders legitimacy both at home and abroad, blunting pressure on human rights, economic openness, and political freedom.

Conclusion

On the evidence, it seems clear that China is rapidly expanding its influence in Africa to secure access to natural resources, to expand Beijing’s political influence, and even to increase its international commercial markets through generous but self-serving diplomatic, financial, and military assistance. Chinese policies are also troubling, especially when they support authoritarian African regimes, hinder local economic development, and exacerbate conflicts and human rights abuses in countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Unfortunately, China’s broad energy, trade, political, diplomatic, and—yes—military interests and activities in Africa threaten to undermine long-standing international efforts to pro­mote regional peace, prosperity, and democracy in Africa. Africa’s tradi­tional European colonial and American partners now find their vision of a continent gov­erned by free-market democracies and the rule of law challenged by Beijing’s scramble for influence and resources.

While China has the potential for doing good in Africa, the question becomes: “Is China’s approach the answer to Africa’s problems or is it just a replay of Africa’s colonial, mercantilistic relationship with Europe?” Or is it something completely different? Perhaps it is too early to tell.

As a scholar from a prominent South African think tank recently put it, “China is both a tantalizing opportunity and a terrifying threat.”[7] That is something both the Africans and the international community will be struggling to understand and deal with as China deepens its involvement in Africa in the years to come.

Peter Brookes is Chung Ju-Yung Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs  in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were delivered in Las Palmas, Spain, on February 9, 2007.

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